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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper reviews New Zealand judicial interpretation of the “acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations” as stated in art 1F(c) Refugee Convention, 
in the light of subsequent foreign jurisprudence. Article 1F excludes claimants from 
gaining refugee status under the Convention if there are “serious reasons for considering” 
they have committed a proscribed act. The ambiguous ambit of art 1F(c) had attracted 
little jurisprudence before the New Zealand authority’s 1995 decision in Refugee Appeal 
2338/94.  However, art 1F(c) jurisprudence has significantly increased in the face of new 
global issues such as terrorism, and an expanding United Nations mandate. This paper 
aims to aid future New Zealand courts in art 1F(c) cases, by assessing Refugee Appeal 
2338/94 in light of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pushpanathan v Canada and 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Al Sirri and DD v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department. 
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I Introduction 
 
The circumstances in which a state can refuse to recognise a bona fide refugee claim 
under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (“the Convention”) has 
been the subject of contention since the Convention’s inception. Article 1F Refugee 
Convention obliges states to exclude otherwise eligible claimants from refugee status 
where there are “serious reasons for considering” that:1  
   
a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity as 
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of 
such crimes; 
 
b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to 
his admission to that country as a refugee; 
 
c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United                                                 
Nations. 
 
The provision seeks to safeguard the humanitarian integrity of the asylum system by 
limiting refugee status to “deserving” claimants and ensuring that the Convention is not 
employed to escape legitimate prosecution.2 Moreover, the article is a pragmatic 
reflection of state parties’ unwillingness to adopt a convention without reserving rights to 
refuse undesirable asylum-seekers.3 The difficulty in defining the exact parameters of 
“undeserving” claimants has produced competing interpretations of art 1F.  
 
This tension is particularly apparent in the context of art 1F(c). This provision justifies 
the exclusion of an individual where there are “serious reasons for considering” that the 
claimant is “guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” 
The article’s ambiguous phrasing renders the provision conducive to international debate, 
which has not yet produced an internationally accepted definition.4 While art 1F(c) 
  
1 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 150 (signed 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 
April 1954), art 1F.  
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of 
the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
HCR/GIP/03/05 (4 September 2003) at [2].  
3 James Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths Canada Ltd, 1991) at 214. 
4 Geoff Gilbert “Current issues in the application of the exclusion clauses” (paper presented for the 50th 
Anniversary of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 2002). 
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jurisprudence was sparse immediately following the adoption of the Refugee Convention, 
the article’s ambit has been increasingly tested in the face of contemporary global issues 
such as terrorism.5 Nevertheless, New Zealand art 1F(c) jurisprudence is confined to a 
single case, namely Refugee Appeal 2338/94.6   
 
This paper aims to inform future decision-making by New Zealand courts in art 1F(c) 
cases by reviewing the approach adopted in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. The first section 
examines methods of interpreting the Convention. The second part reviews New 
Zealand’s interpretation of art 1F(c) “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations” in light of subsequent jurisprudence in the Canadian Supreme Court case 
of Pushpanathan v Canada and the United Kingdom Supreme Court case of Al Sirri and 
DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department.7 Finally, the paper considers which 
approach should be adopted by the New Zealand courts in future cases.  Additional issues 
exist in the context of art 1F(c), but are beyond the scope of this paper.8  
 
II Interpreting the Refugee Convention  
 
A Principles of Interpretation 
 
While domestic statutes are generally governed by the Interpretation Act 1999, legislation 
incorporating the Convention into New Zealand law must be interpreted in accordance 
with international legal principles. Section 129(1) of the Immigration Act (“the Act”) 
states that a claimant is entitled to refugee status “if he or she is a refugee within the 
meaning of the Refugee Convention.”9 Section 127(2)(b) of the Act requires decision-
makers to act in accordance with New Zealand’s international obligations under the 
  
5 Satvinder Singh Juss “Terrorism and the Exclusion of Refugee Status in the UK” (2012) 17 J Conflict & 
Sec L 465 at 465; James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey “Framing Refugee Protection in the New World 
Disorder” (2001) 34 Corn ILJ 257 at 258-260.  
6 Refugee Appeal 2338/94 RSAA Auckland, 30 November 1995, BO Nicholson and V Shaw.  
7 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6; Pushpanathan v Canada [1998] SCR 982 (SCC);  Al Sirri v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 
UKSC 54. 
8 For example, whether art 1F(c) should be confined to non-state actors or the level of individual culpability 
required to fall within (c). For a comprehensive overview. For further reading, see Michael Kingsley 
Nyinah “Exclusion under article 1F: some reflections on Context, Principles and Practice” (2000) 12 IJRL 
295.  
9 Immigration Act 2009, s 129(1).  
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Refugee Convention when exercising powers under the Act.10 Moreover, the Convention 
is reproduced in sch 1 of the Act. These provisions signal that the Convention is directly 
incorporated into New Zealand law, unqualified by domestic statute. On the contrary, 
some Refugee Convention signatories have qualified Convention wording with domestic 
statutory provisions, a point which will be discussed later.  
 
The requirement to invoke international legal principles when interpreting domestic 
provisions which implement international conventions is affirmed by the Court of Appeal 
in Tamil X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority, citing Lord Steyn in R v Secretary of State 
ex parte Adan.11 Lord Steyn held that only one “true” interpretation of an international 
treaty exists, namely an autonomous international interpretation “untrammeled by notions 
of… national legal culture”.12  
 
As the New Zealand Immigration Act defers interpretation to the international sphere, 
New Zealand courts are free to search for a “true autonomous and international 
meaning”13 of the Refugee Convention, unrestricted by domestic legislative 
qualifications. However, the legitimate authority from which to obtain such a meaning 
remains the subject of debate, as there is no universally endorsed specialist international 
body charged with providing interpretative guidance for the Refugee Convention.14  
 
 
B Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
 
The scope of legitimate authority for interpreting international instruments is outlined in 
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 (“VCLT”). As subsequent 
international instruments are generally enacted subject to pre-existing international law, 
the VCLT would normally be inapplicable to the earlier-created Refugee Convention.15 
However, the VCLT is regarded as an authoritative statement of pre-existing customary 
  
10 Immigration Act 2009, s 127(2)(b), Rodger Haines QC “The domestic application of international human 
rights standards in New Zealand” (Spring Seminar Series, University of Auckland, 2004).  
11 Tamil X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2009] NZCA 488, [2010] 2 NZLR 73.  
at [74]-[75].  
12 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan [2001] 2 AC 477 (HL) at 605. 
13 At 605.  
14 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [56].  
15 Rodger Haines QC, above n 10.  
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law, and has been recognised by New Zealand courts as applying to the Refugee 
Convention.16  
 
Article 31(1) VCLT requires that international instruments be interpreted “in good faith” 
adopting the ordinary meaning of provisions within their context, and in light of their 
object and purpose.17 The “purpose” of a provision can be ascertained from its preamble, 
annexes, and related instruments in connection with the conclusion of the treaty which 
has been accepted by all signatories.18 According to art 31(3), other relevant materials for 
interpretation include subsequent agreements or practice relating to interpretation which 
has been endorsed by the parties, and other applicable rules of international law.19 Where 
ambiguity persists after an art 31 exercise, the interpreter may examine the travaux 
preparatoires and the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion.20  
 
1 Article 31(1) VCLT and the Refugee Convention 
 
(a) Object and purpose of the Refugee Convention 
 
The Refugee Convention evolved in response to the limited capacity of United Nations 
(“UN”) agencies to cope with the proliferation of refugees proceeding World War II.21 
Between July 1947 and December 1950, the UN-mandated International Refugee Office 
was charged with assisting over 1.5 million asylum seekers.22 The preamble of the 
Convention establishes its human rights character, affirming state parties’ commitment to 
the provision of fundamental human rights without discrimination.23 New Zealand courts 
have approved commentator James Hathaway’s formulation of the Convention object, 
  
16 Rodger Haines QC, above n 10.  
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980), art 31(1).  
18 Article 31(2).  
19 Article 31(3).  
20 Article 32.  
21 Guy Goodwin Gill “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” (2008) Audiovisual Library of 
International Law <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html>.  
22 United Nations “United Nations Yearbook 1951” (2013) UNHCR <.http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4e1ee76b0&query=+drafting%20+notes>.   
23 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, preamble.  
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stating that the treaty is concerned with activities which “deny human dignity in any key 
way”.24  
 
(b) Object and purpose of art 1F Refugee Convention 
 
Article 1F seeks to safeguard the humanitarian integrity of the Convention, by denying 
refugee status to those who have flouted international humanitarian law within their home 
territories.25 The article also preserves the integrity of the asylum system by ensuring that 
it is not used as a shield for fugitives seeking to avoid legitimate prosecution.26 Finally, 
the provision gives states discretion to refuse “undesirable” refugees, reflecting a 
pragmatic political admission without which states would have unlikely acceded to the 
Convention.27  
 
(c) Implications for the interpretation of art 1F(c) 
 
As indicated above, art 1F is integral in safeguarding the integrity of the asylum system 
and its underlying humanitarian principles. It ensures that the system is not invoked in a 
counterproductive manner by sheltering those who have undermined such principles 
within their home states. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (“UNHCR”), art 1F(c) is specifically designed to give effect to these aims by 
ensuring that the “persecutors” from which claimants seek protection are not granted 
asylum under the Convention.28 Given the centrality of art 1F’s utility to the overall 
humanitarian objective of the Convention, the UNHCR encourages states to apply the 
article “scrupulously”.29 Nevertheless, the UNHCR argues that the provision’s general 
wording and the serious consequences facing an individual refused refugee protection 
require that decision-makers apply art 1F with caution.30  
  
24 Refugee Appeal 71427/99 RSAA Auckland, 16 August 2000, RPG Haines and L Tremewan at [50].   
25 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of 
the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
HCR/GIP/03/05 (4 September 2003) at [3]. 
26 At [3]. 
27 James C Hathaway Reconceiving International Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 
1997) at 214. 
28 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Note on the Exclusion Clauses”(30 May 1997) 
UNHCR < http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cf68.html> at [3].  
29 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Statement on Article 1F Refugee Convention” (July 
2009) Refworld < http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a5de2992.html> at 6.  
30 At 6.   
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However, the extent to which “serious consequences” arise from exclusion under art 1F 
varies according to an individual’s circumstances. While a state is precluded from 
granting refugee status to a claimant who fulfills art 1F criteria, this does not 
automatically trigger an individual’s refoulement, and the state is not prevented from 
granting other forms of protection.31 A claimant can invoke alternative international legal 
protection, such as the absolute prohibition on refoulement under art 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).32 Moreover, Al Sirri and DD concern claimants who have been 
granted a right to remain in the host country, and who are merely litigating their right to 
the additional benefits conferred under the Refugee Convention.33 Such benefits include a 
right to “public relief and assistance” and “elementary education” equivalent to that of a 
national.34 
 
The extent to which the level of adverse consequences facing an unsuccessful claimant 
has been material to the courts’ decisions in Al Sirri and DD is unclear. Nevertheless, one 
must read these cases in light of the individual circumstances of the claimant. Moreover, 
the UNHCR’s claim that “serious consequences” necessitates a restrictive approach to art 
1F(c) can be contested. Nevertheless, due to the potential for serious consequences of 
exclusion in some circumstances, the bulk of international jurisprudence has accepted the 
necessity for restrictive construction of the art 1F subclauses.35    
 
2 Article 31(3)(b) VCLT and the Refugee Convention 
 
Article 31(3)(b) provides opportunity for treaty interpretation to evolve with the changing 
global context by allowing states to take into account “subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes agreement of the parties.”36 The exact 
parameters of this phrase remain unclear.37 Traditional interpretations of art 31(3)(b) 
have confined its scope to “concordant, common and consistent” series of acts 
  
31 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, above n 25,at [5].  
32 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 1465 UNTS 85 (signed 
10 December 1983, entered into force 26 June 1987), art 3.   
33 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [1].  
34 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, arts 22, 23.  
35 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [16].  
36 Campbell McLachlan “The Evolution of Treaty Obligations in International Law” in Georg Nolte (ed) 
Treaties and Subsequent Practice (Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2013) at 69. 
37 Campbell McLachlan, above n 36, at 69.  
  Laws 489  
  Abby Ward 
  300293052 
 
10 
 
establishing a pattern of interpretation among the parties.38 However, in the context of 
large multilateral agreements such as the Refugee Convention, to which 146 states are 
party, such a consensus is difficult to obtain.39 Moreover, the body of practice generated 
by contemporary treaties has expanded beyond state parties to external bodies, such as 
non-governmental organisations and technical treaty bodies.40  
 
The House of Lords in A v Home Secretary utilised such extrinsic materials in 
determining the scope of art 15 of the Convention Against Torture.41 In defining art 15, 
the court cited bodies external to the Convention parties, such as specialist committees 
established under the CAT and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).42 While Bingham LJ noted that such sources were non-binding on UK 
courts, the court adopted its views in the absence of contrary binding authority.43 
Reference to these materials reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision based on older 
international law.44 According to commentator Campbell McLachlan, specialist treaty 
bodies’ opinions would not normally be regarded as representing “agreement of the 
parties” under art 31(3)(b).45 However, the provision of interpretative guidance is 
mandated to the organisation through the treaty provisions establishing these bodies, that 
are central to their existence.46 Therefore, McLachlan argues that A v Home Security 
suggests that art 31(3)(b) should be liberally construed to include external sources.47  
 
(a) UNHCR guidelines 
 
The contested legal status of the UNHCR guidelines can be considered in light of A v 
Home Secretary. Under art 35 of the Refugee Convention, contracting states undertook to 
“facilitate” the UNHCR’s duty of “supervising the application of provisions of this 
  
38 At 76.  
39 146 states have signed the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention. United Nations Treaty Collection 
“Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” 2013 United Nations < 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=V-
5&chapter=5&lang=en#Participants >; Campbell McLachlan, above n 36, at 71.  
40 Campbell McLachlan, above n 36, at 76.  
41 A v Home Security [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68. 
42 At [35], [43]-[44]. 
43 At [45].  
44 Campbell McLachlan, above n 36, at 76.  
45 At 76.  
46 At 76.  
47 At 76.  
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Convention.”48 The UK Supreme Court stated that the UNHCR’s opinion should be 
afforded “considerable weight” given this obligation, while accepting that they do not 
bind signatories.49 Moreover, commentator Satvinder Singh Juss argues that the UNHCR 
is a “well-qualified” organisation whose opinions should be given significant 
consideration in the absence of an international judicial body charged with 
interpretation.50  The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Attorney General v E held that the 
UNHCR guidelines could be employed as extrinsic interpretative aids in ascertaining the 
meaning of the purpose of the Convention under art 31 of the VCLT, but went on to 
consider that such aids did not constitute binding authority.51 
 
However, the New Zealand High Court in X & Y v Refugee Status Appeals Authority 
declined to follow UNHCR guidelines which ran contrary to the Convention purpose and 
House of Lords authority.52 Moreover, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority departed 
from UNHCR guidelines on proportionality in Refugee Appeal 75692, deeming them 
“unpersuasive” in light of academic criticism.53 The Authority held that although the 
UNHCR guidelines may be of assistance “on occasion” their origin is “problematical” 
and their content often contested.54 The Authority preferred to obtain the Convention’s 
meaning from art 31 VCLT.55  
 
In addition, some commentators are skeptical of the UNHCR guidelines. Hathaway and 
Harvey highlight the inconsistent reasoning employed by the organisation in promoting 
considerations of security under art 1F, a position subsequently challenged by courts.56 
Hathaway argues that the UNHCR’s increasing involvement in the provision of refugee 
services renders it unable to independently supervise the global scheme, as it is no longer 
at “arms-length” from the Convention.57 Moreover, the UNHCR’s reliance on individual 
state funding undermines the organisation’s political autonomy, despite its statutory 
  
48 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art 35. Also stated in the preamble to the Convention.   
49 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [36]; citing R v Asfaw [2008] UKHL 
31 at [13].   
50 James C Hathaway “Who Should Watch over Refugee Law?” (2002) 14 Forced Migration Review 23 at 
25. 
51 Attorney General v E [2000] 3 NZLR 257 (CA) at [90]-[92]. 
52 X & Y v Refugee Status Appeals Authority HC Auckland CIV-2006-404-4213, 17 December 2007 at [16].  
53 Refugee Appeal 75692 RSAA Auckland, 3 March 2006, RPG Haines QC and PJ Andrews at [70].   
54 At [71].  
55 At [72]. 
56 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 259. 
57 James C Hathaway “Who Should Watch over Refugee Law?,” above n 50, at 25.  
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imperative of political neutrality.58 Hathaway also challenges the UK court’s assumption 
that art 35 imports an obligation on states to afford “considerable weight” to UNHCR 
publications, arguing that states are the ultimate Convention arbiters and are not 
precluded by art 35 from establishing an alternative international body charged with 
interpretation duties.59  
 
Nevertheless, following A v Home Secretary, UNHCR guidelines can arguably be 
invoked under art 31(3)(b). The UNHCR could be viewed as analogous to the external 
bodies cited in A v Home Secretary, such as the Committee Against Torture and the 
Human Rights Committee (which operate under the CAT and ICCPR respectively). As 
under art 35 Refugee Convention, these bodies’ parent conventions confer supervision 
duties which the signatories have agreed to respect.60 However, the UNHCR has 
significantly less supervisory powers than its ICCPR and CAT counterparts. State parties 
to the ICCPR and CAT are bound to submit periodic reports to the committees, unlike the 
UNHCR. The committees also have the power to issue adjudication on states’ 
compliance.61 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against 
Torture have a more limited mandate than the UNHCR, confined to monitoring states’ 
implementation.62 This ensures that the bodies can effectively supervise the treaty 
implementation at “arms-length”. 
 
Therefore, as Hathaway contends, the UNHCR is significantly less authoritative than its 
ICCPR and CAT counterparts.63 As a result, it is unlikely that the UNHCR would be 
afforded equivalent weight under art 32(2)(b) to the bodies referenced in A v Home 
Secretary. Nonetheless, if A v Home Secretary is construed as standing for the 
proposition that a variety of extrinsic materials may be permissible under art 31(2)(b), it 
is arguable that the UNHCR materials can be legitimately employed. Alternatively, the 
  
58 At 26; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Statute of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees” (2013) Refworld < http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html> at 6.  
59 James C Hathaway, above n 50, at 24.   
60 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 179 (signed 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 20 March 1976), art 40(4); Convention Against Torture, arts 21, 22. 
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 40(4); Convention Against Torture, arts 21, 22. 
62Officer for the High Commissioner for Human Rights “Convention Against Torture” (2013) United 
Nations Human Rights < http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIndex.aspx>; Officer for 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights “Human Rights Committee” (2013) United Nations Human 
Rights <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx>; United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, above n 58. 
63 James C Hathaway, above n 50, at 24. 
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New Zealand Court of Appeal has endorsed their citation in determining the object and 
purpose of the Convention under art 31(1).64 Nevertheless, the issues of reliability and 
political independence cited by Hathaway remain.  
 
 
(b) Overseas Case Law 
 
In addition to the relevant material listed in the VCLT, the Court of Appeal in Tamil X 
held that foreign case law is relevant to the interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
insofar as it reflects the “true, autonomous and international meaning” of the 
Convention.65 Thus, failure of foreign courts to adhere to international principles of 
interpretation outlined in the VCLT may limit the case’s authority. Similarly, domestic 
qualifications on the incorporation of the Refugee Convention may prevent a court from 
arriving at an “international” meaning.  
 
As Canadian legislation directly incorporates art 1F(c) into the Immigration Act 1985 in a 
similar manner to New Zealand, Canadian courts are able to adopt an “international” 
definition for Convention provisions without domestic limitations.66  In contrast, several 
domestic and European legislative provisions restrict the ability of UK courts to apply a 
“true, autonomous and international” meaning to the Refugee Convention. Therefore, UK 
case law must be viewed in light of its legislative context. This is further discussed below 
in the analysis of Al Sirri and DD. 
 
 
III Meaning of “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations” 
A Introduction 
 
This section will evaluate competing judicial interpretations of “acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations” with reference to the principles of 
interpretation discussed above. As the paper aims to inform decision-making in the New 
  
64 Attorney General v E [2000] 3 NZLR 257 (CA) at [90]-[92]. 
65 Tamil X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2009] NZCA 488, [2010] 2 NZLR 73 at [74]-[75].  
66 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [95].  
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Zealand context, the section will first examine the existing New Zealand authority, and 
compare this approach to successive decisions from Canada and the United Kingdom.  
 
B Wide approach 
1 New Zealand: Refugee Appeal 2338/94 
 
(a) Facts 
 
The Refugee Status Appeals Authority considers the scope of “acts contrary to the 
principles and purposes of the United Nations” in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. This case 
concerns an Indian national who applied for refugee status after serving a ten year prison 
sentence for serious drug trafficking in New Zealand.  
 
(b) Decision 
 
The Authority considers the UNHCR and academics’ recommendations that the general 
and ambiguous language of art 1F(c) requires courts to adopt a restrictive interpretation to 
avoid interpretative abuse.67 Such a restrictive interpretation would confine art 1F(c) to 
the purposes and principles outlined in the preamble, and arts 1 and 2 of the UN 
Charter.68  
 
The preamble to the Charter states that the UN seeks to affirm commitment to various 
principles, such as fundamental human rights and equal rights of women and men. The 
“purposes” listed in art 1 consist of maintaining international security, developing 
friendly international relations, co-operating to solve international problems and 
promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition, the 
“principles” covered in art 2 include sovereign equality of nations and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes.69  
 
However, the Authority rejects the confinement of art 1F(c) to the UN Charter, instead 
adopting the wide “contemporary” definition formulated in the Canadian case of 
  
67 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6. 
68 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6. 
69 Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (signed 24 October 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945). See appendix 1 for a full list.  
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Thamothatampillai v the Minister of Employment and Immigration.70 The Authority 
holds that an ordinary reading of art 1F(c) does not support a restrictive interpretation, as 
art 1F(c) contains no express qualifications on the scope of its application unlike its 1F 
counterparts.71 Acts listed under art 1F(a)  are limited to those found in “international 
instruments drawn up to make provision for such crimes”, and art 1F(b) is confined to 
crimes committed “outside the country of refuge prior to [the claimant’s] admission to 
that country as a refugee”.72 Moreover, the Authority cites an academic’s claim that the 
travaux preparatoires do not reveal intentions for art 1F(c) to be interpreted narrowly.73  
 
Therefore, the Authority holds that an ordinary reading of art 1F(c) would extend beyond 
the UN Charter to cover “contemporary” UN concerns.74 Such contemporary concerns 
include the fight against narcotics, in which 19 UN organisations have been engaged.75  
 
However, the Authority argues that the appellant’s claim would also fail if art 1F(c) acts 
were confined to the UN Charter, as the fight against narcotics also falls within the 
Charter’s sphere.76  
 
2  Canada: Pushpanathan v Canada minority 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court case of Pushpanathan was decided under analogous facts 
and domestic statutory context to Refugee Appeal 2338/94, and is therefore highly 
applicable in evaluating New Zealand’s interpretation of art 1F(c).77 The appellant 
applied for refugee status to avoid deportation from Canada after being convicted for 
trafficking heroin and serving a ten year prison sentence in Canada.78  
 
The dissenting judgment in Pushpanathan adopts a wide approach to art 1F(c) similar to 
the approach in Refugee Appeal 2338/94.  In line with the New Zealand Authority’s 
approach, Cory J argues that the provision should be construed in the light of expanding 
  
70 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6.  
71 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6.   
72 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6.  
73 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6. 
74 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6.  
75 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6.  
76 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6.  
77 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [1]; Immigration Act RSC 1985 c 1-2, s 2(1).  
78 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [2]-[4].  
  Laws 489  
  Abby Ward 
  300293052 
 
16 
 
UN activities, and therefore will not necessarily be restricted to the purposes and 
principles contained within the UN Charter.79 While not every UN initiative will justify 
exclusion, activities which have attracted intense and continuing UN activity should be 
included under art 1F(c), as this renders them sufficiently connected to the fundamental 
goals of the UN.80  
 
According to Cory J, narcotics trafficking has been the subject of sufficient UN efforts to 
fall within art 1F(c). UN anti-narcotic pursuits have included over a dozen multilateral 
instruments, three UN bodies, and United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) 
resolutions declaring drug trafficking to be a threat to “the health and wellbeing of 
mankind” and “the stability of nations.”81 Therefore, in accordance with Refugee Appeal 
2338/94, the minority contends that the claimant’s extensive involvement in drug 
trafficking brings him within art 1F(c).  
 
3 Critique of wide approach in 2338/94 and Pushpanathan 
 
(a) Distinction between arts 1F and 33(2) 
 
As the claimants in both cases could fall within art 33(2), the courts arguably expand art 
1F(c) beyond its intended scope. Article 33(2) permits states to deport a refugee where 
there are “reasonable grounds” for believing the person is a “danger to the security” of 
the host country or “having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country.”82  
   
There are several notable differences between art 33(2) and the art 1F clauses. First, the 
provisions serve distinct purposes, obliging decision-makers to consider different factors 
in assessing whether it applies to an individual. Article 1F seeks to protect the 
humanitarian integrity of the refugee regime by ascribing refugee status based on whether 
a claimant’s past actions merit his or her protection. Therefore, considerations of the 
effect of a claimant’s presence on the host state in the future are irrelevant.83 In contrast, 
  
79 At [128].  
80 At [125].  
81 At [107]-[120]. 
82 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art 33(2).  
83 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, above n 29,at 8.  
  Laws 489  
  Abby Ward 
  300293052 
 
17 
 
art 33(2) seeks to safeguard the security of the host country, and therefore assesses the 
individual’s potential danger to the host state.84  
 
Second, art 1F and art 33(2) cause different legal consequences for an individual. Article 
1F forms part of the definition of a “refugee” within the Convention, and therefore 
renders an individual unable to qualify as a “refugee” under the Convention if the clause 
is invoked.85 While the decision-maker is precluded from granting refugee benefits, an 
individual is not necessarily to be deported, and the state may provide alternative 
protection for the claimant.86 In contrast, art 33(2) triggers the individual’s automatic 
deportation from the country of refuge, although they remain a “refugee” within the 
Convention.87 However, the New Zealand courts held in Zaoui v Attorney-General that 
art 33(2) must be exercised in accordance with New Zealand’s obligations under the CAT 
and the ICCPR. A decision-maker is therefore precluded from invoking art 33(2) where 
the individual is at risk of suffering torture or arbitrary deprivation of life.88 Therefore, 
the practical impacts of these distinct legal implications are not often evident, especially 
in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zaoui. Under both articles, it is likely that 
the state will attempt to return the individual to their home country, unless prevented by 
international obligations under alternative instruments.  
 
A third differentiating factor is the threshold of proof required for each provision to be 
satisfied. Under art 1F, the decision maker must find “serious reasons for considering” 
that a claimant has committed a proscribed act. On the other hand, art 33(2) requires that 
the individual has been convicted by the “final judgment” of a court. This suggests that 
art 33(2) has a higher threshold of proof. While New Zealand courts have attempted to 
avoid comparing “serious reasons” to domestic standards of proof, the courts have 
accepted that the threshold is lower than the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable 
doubt”.89 On the contrary, a “final judgment” as required under art 33(2) obligates the 
Crown to have proved “beyond reasonable doubt” that a claimant carried out the alleged 
act.90  
 
  
84 At 8.  
85 At 8.  
86 At 8. 
87 At 8. 
88 Attorney v Zaoui [2005] NZSC 38, [2006] 1 NZLR 289.  
89 Attorney General v Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107, [2011] 1 NZLR 721 at [39].   
90 Geoff Gilbert, above n 4.  
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In the light of the above arguments, the majority in Pushpanathan considers that the facts 
of the case are designed to fall under art 33(2), and therefore should not also be covered 
by art 1F.91 Accommodating art 33(2) “particularly serious” crimes within art 1F(c) 
would undermine art 1F(b)’s restriction for analogous acts, which limits them to outside 
the country of refuge and prior to admission as a refugee. Commentator Michael 
Kingsley Nyinah agrees that art 1F(c) should not be invoked where a more specific 
provision such as art 33(2) would suffice, as this avoids attributing overly expansive 
meaning to art 1F(c), and which could lead to over-zealous exclusions of claimants.92 
Therefore, the fact situations of Refugee Appeal 2338/94 and Pushpanathan are more 
appropriately covered by art 33(2).  
 
(b) Consideration of claimant’s danger to host state 
 
In addition, the Pushpanathan minority’s argument can be criticised for misconstruing 
the purpose of art 1F(c). Cory J’s analysis dedicates much discussion to the detrimental 
effects of the narcotics industry on Canadian society, concluding that Canada should not 
be “burdened” with a refugee who “has demonstrated his danger to Canadian society”.93 
As discussed above, such considerations suggest that minority has incorrectly 
characterised the purpose of art 1F(c), under which an individual’s potential risk to host 
country security is irrelevant.94 Despite acknowledging that consideration of an 
individual’s danger to a host state falls exclusively within the ambit of art 33(2),95 the 
minority appears to invoke these considerations in justifying the place of narcotics 
trafficking within art 1F(c). However, the Canadian impacts of drug trafficking merely 
support Cory J’s discussion of the UN initiatives, and are not central to the rationale 
justifying their inclusion within art 1F(c). Nevertheless, their discussion gives reason to 
doubt the extent of the dissenting judges’ understanding of the provision.  
 
(c) Travaux preparatoires 
 
Refugee Appeal 2338/94 arguably mischaracterises the travaux preparatoires. The 
Authority justifies a wide formulation of art 1F(c) partly due to the absence of contrary 
  
91 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [75]. 
92 Michael Kingsley Nyinah above n 5, at 309.  
93 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [154].  
94 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [58]; James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 257. 
95 At [75].  
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evidence in the travaux preparatoires.96 However, commentators have highlighted 
several drafters’ concerns that the general phrasing of the provision would be abused by 
states.97  
 
C Narrow approach 
1 Pushpanathan majority 
 
In contrast, the majority in Pushpanathan applies a restrictive interpretation of “acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN” in accordance with the bulk of 
international commentary.98 The court examines the drafters’ intentions in the travaux 
preparatoires, concluding that the delegates intended to ascribe art 1F(c) with a narrower 
meaning than the purposes and principles articulated in the UN Charter.99 According to 
the court, the drafters intended art 1F(c) to cover crimes against humanity in a non-war 
context, as they were concerned that such crimes would not fall under art 1F(a).100 
During the drafting debate, the French delegation argued that the relevant international 
instrument for interpreting art 1F(a), the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, applied only to crimes against humanity in wartime.101 Thus, several delegates 
originally concerned with the general phrasing of art 1F(c) were convinced that its 
wording would be narrowly interpreted as confined to such acts.102  
 
The majority cites Hathaway in defining the overarching purpose of the Convention, 
holding that it is concerned with activities which “deny human dignity in any key way,” 
namely sustained and systemic violations of human rights.103 The human rights character 
of the Convention is affirmed in the Canadian Immigration Act, which refers to the 
“humanitarian tradition” of the refugee scheme.104 
  
96 Refugee Appeal 2338/94, above n 6. 
97 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [62]; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, above n 
29, at 13.  
98 For example: Michael Kingsley Nyinah, above n 5, at 297; Edward Kwakwa “Article 1F(c): Acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” 12 IJRL 79 at 82.  
99 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [62].  
100 At [59]-[60].  
101At [59].  
102 At [60].  
103 At [63].  
104 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [57].  
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In the light of travaux preparatoires and the purpose of the Convention, the majority 
claim that “purposes and principles” in art 1F(c) should be given a narrower meaning 
than one which would be inferred from the UN Charter.105 Article 1F(c) was designed to 
exclude individuals only where they are responsible for serious, sustained or systemic 
violations of fundamental human rights in a non-war setting.106 Acts falling under art 
1F(c) must be acknowledged by widely accepted international agreement or explicit UN 
declarations reflecting a reasonable consensus of the international community as contrary 
to UN purposes and principles. Alternatively, courts may identify art 1F(c) acts where 
they constitute a sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental human 
rights as to amount to persecution.107  
 
The court holds that drug trafficking has not attracted an explicit UN statement, nor 
widely accepted international agreement that it is contrary to UN purposes and 
principles.108 Drug trafficking does not violate any core human right or form “part of the 
corpus of fundamental human rights”, and therefore cannot be viewed as a serious, 
sustained or systematic violation of human rights.109 Therefore, the majority declines to 
exclude the claimant under art 1F(c), and instead insists that the Minister may still invoke 
art 33(2) in order to deport the individual.110  
 
2 Critique of narrow approach in Pushpanathan 
 
(a) Overly narrow construction of art 1F(c) 
It is arguable that the majority’s formulation of art 1F(c) excludes acts which would fall 
under art 1F(c) in a “common sense” interpretation.   The court in Al Sirri and DD 
criticises the Pushpanathan majority’s approach to interpretation of art 1F(c) as overly 
restrictive.111 The facts of DD, where the claimant was involved in armed combat against 
the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”), would not fall within 
the scope of the Canadian Supreme Court’s definition of art 1F(c), as it has not been 
  
105 At [62].  
106 At [64].  
107 At [65].  
108 At [69].  
109 At [72].  
110 At [75].  
111 At [67].  
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explicitly identified as contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, nor does it 
constitute a serious, sustained or systemic violation of fundamental human rights.112 
Nevertheless, both parties in DD accepted that a “common sense” interpretation of art 
1F(c) would include attacks against UN-mandated forces.113  
Similarly, the minority in Pushpanathan claim that the majority’s requirement for a 
“serious and sustained violation of human rights” is an unnecessary and arbitrary 
limitation on art 1F(c). The minority highlights that the preservation of human rights is 
merely one of the purposes and principles articulated in the UN Charter, and the 
majority’s formulation precludes consideration of the other principles.114  
This suggests that the Canadian attempt to give effect to the original drafters’ intentions 
by narrowing the scope of art 1F(c) beyond the purposes and principles of the UN Charter 
is overly narrow, and runs counter to a “common sense” interpretation of the clause.  
 
(b) Use of UN declarations in defining art 1F(c) acts 
Second, Hathaway and Harvey challenge the majority’s claim that a UN declaration 
representing a reasonable consensus of the international community can be “considered 
determinative” of an art 1F(c) act. The majority uses several UNGA Resolutions as 
examples of such declarations.115 Hathaway and Harvey argue that non-binding 
resolutions should not be able to “determinatively” alter the content of art 1F(c) Refugee 
Convention.116 The court cites UNGA Resolution 51/210, which designates terrorism as 
contrary to UN purposes and principles.117 Hathaway and Harvey argue that this 
declaration is overly broad, and leaves art 1F(c) open to abuse by state parties in the 
absence of an internationally-accepted definition of the concept.118    
 
  
112 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [67].  
113 At [67]. 
114 At [127]. 
115 At [66].  
116 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 271-272.  
117 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [66]. 
118 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 271-272.  
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D UNHCR approach 
1 UK: Al Sirri and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
 
The UK Supreme Court case of Al Sirri and DD concerns two separate asylum claims 
under art 1F(c). In Al Sirri, the court examined the extent to which terrorist activities can 
be considered contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, in the light of the 
claimant’s alleged involvement in terrorist organisations.119 DD considered whether 
participating in armed combat against a UN-mandated force was sufficient to warrant 
exclusion under art 1F(c), as the appellant had fought against the ISAF in Afghanistan.120   
 
(a) Factual analogies with Pushpanathan and Refugee Appeal 2338/94 
 
The ability to directly compare Al Sirri and DD with Refugee Appeal 2338/94 and 
Pushpanathan is somewhat constrained by factual differences between the cases. The 
appellants in Al Sirri and DD were not at risk of deportation as they had satisfied 
alternative protection grounds, namely a substantial risk of torture under art 3 Convention 
Against Torture.121 The case merely concerned the appellants’ entitlement to additional 
benefits conferred by virtue of refugee status.122 Therefore, exclusion from refugee status 
under art 1F would not confer the “serious consequence” of refoulement on the 
appellants, unlike in Refugee Appeal 2338/94 and Pushpanathan. This factor may have 
encouraged the UK Supreme Court to adopt a more liberal interpretation of art 1F(c), as 
the UNHCR’s insistence on a “restrictive” interpretation is premised on such “serious 
consequences” arising from art 1F exclusion.123  
 
(b) UK Statutory context 
 
The UK courts are constrained in their ability pursue a “true, autonomous and 
international” interpretation of the Refugee Convention by the domestic statutory 
  
119 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [2].  
120 At [2]. 
121 At [2].  
122 See discussion under interpretation section.  
123 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees (January 1992) Refworld < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3314.html>.  
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context.124 Despite the court’s statement that the proper interpretation of art 1F(c) should 
be devoid of domestic legal influence,125 the court is nevertheless bound by a European 
Council asylum Directive intended to provide interpretative guidance to EU members.126  
 
Unlike in New Zealand, the Refugee Convention is not directly incorporated into UK 
law. Nevertheless, art 1F is incorporated into UK domestic law through the Refugee or 
Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 (“the 
Regulations”).127 However, as these Regulations were introduced to implement 
Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC (“the Directive”), they adopt the modifications of art 
1F contained with the Directive.  
 
While the Directive was not intended to alter EU states’ obligations under the Refugee 
Convention, but to merely provide interpretative guidance, the Directive’s treatment of 
art 1F(c) somewhat constrains states’ interpretative autonomy.128 Article 12(2)(c) of the 
Qualification Directive states that art 1F(c) acts are found in the preamble and arts 1 and 
2 of the UN Charter.129 This article is binding on UK courts through its inclusion in the 
Regulations.130 Moreover, recital 22 encourages states to define “acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the UN” as those articulated in the aforementioned sections of 
the UN Charter, and “among others” United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) 
resolutions concerning terrorism.131 Recital 22 is not binding on EU members.132  
 
Moreover, the UK parliament has enacted additional statutory directions for art1F(c) 
interpretation. Section 54 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (“IANA”) 
obliges courts to include “terrorism” as defined in s 1 Terrorism Act 2000 within the 
scope of art 1F(c).133 Section 1 Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as encompassing 
certain actions or threats designed to influence governmental organisations or intimidate 
  
124 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan, above n 12, at 605. 
125 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [36].  
126 Hugo Storey “EU Qualification Directive: A Brave New World?” (2008) 20 IJRL 1 at 10.  
127 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [6].  
128 Hugo Storey, above n 126, at 10.  
129 At [5].  
130 At [4], [6].  
131 At [4].  
132 Carl Gardner “EU primary, secondary and tertiary legislation” (2013) Insite Law 
<http://www.insitelawmagazine.com/eulawch3.htm>.  
133 At [4]-[5].  
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the public in pursuance of a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.134 This 
definition clearly includes acts of domestic terrorism which have no international 
repercussions.135 
  
 However, the court in Al Sirri and DD holds that s 54 IANA must be read down to 
comply with art 12(2)(c) Directive.136 As art 12(2)(c) states that UN instruments are the 
appropriate source for ascertaining art 1F(c) acts, domestic provisions, to the extent that 
they conflict with the UN provisions, cannot be used to interpret art 1F(c). Therefore, s 
54 IANA does not restrict the court’s interpretation beyond the EU Directive.137    
 
 
(c) Implications of Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC for art 1F(c) interpretation 
 
The Directive appears to exclude the wide interpretative approach adopted by the 
Authority in Refugee Appeal 2338/94 and the minority in Pushpanathan, as art 12(2)(c) 
limits art 1F(c) acts to the those articulated in the UN Charter. However, recital 22 also 
includes UNSC resolutions on terrorism “among others”, indicating that art 1F(c) acts be 
extended beyond the Charter. Under this formulation, there may be scope for European 
courts to refer to extraneous instruments, such as those cited by the New Zealand 
Authority and the Pushpanthan minority, depending on the meaning ascribed to “among 
others”.   
 
Furthermore, the restrictive interpretation advocated by the Pushpanathan majority is 
arguably precluded by the Directive. The Pushpanathan majority insists that the original 
drafters intended art 1F(c) to have a narrower meaning than one “naturally inferred” from 
the UN Charter.138 However, art 12(2)(c) Qualification Directive equates art 1F(c) acts 
with those outlined in the purposes and principles of the Charter, and stretches its sphere 
beyond the purposes and principles contained within the Charter under recital 22. The 
possible effect of the Directive on the court’s reasoning in Al Sirri and DD will be 
considered in later discussion.  
 
 
  
134 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) 48 & 49 Eliz II c 11, s 1.  
135 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [8].  
136 At [36].  
137 At [36] 
138 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [62].  
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(d) Decision in Al Sirri  
 
The court in Al Sirri considers the extent to which acts of terrorism fall within the ambit 
of art 1F(c), as the appellant was accused of involvement in organisations linked to 
terrorism. 
 
The Crown argued that any act of terrorism meeting the definition of s 1 Terrorism Act 
falls with the ambit of art 1F(c). The Crown invoked recital 22 of the Directive in support 
of this proposition, which  echoes UNSC Resolution 1373 in declaring that acts of 
terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.139 The Crown 
highlighted that s 54 IANA obliges the court to apply the domestic meaning to terrorism 
when considering terrorist acts within art 1F(c).140   
 
Counsel for Al Sirri contended that acts of terrorism must have a significant impact on 
international peace and security in order to fall within art 1F(c).141 First, counsel cited 
UNHCR guidelines stating that art 1F(c) acts must be “capable of affecting international 
peace, security and peaceful relations between states.”142 Second, counsel referenced the 
European Court of Justice case of Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D. The court in B 
and D affirmed that terrorist acts could fall within both arts 1F(b) and (c).143 According 
to the appellant, B and D also drew a distinction between domestic and international 
terrorist acts, holding that the former was covered under art 1F(b), whereas only the latter 
could fall within art 1F(c).144 However, the Supreme court in Al Sirri acknowledge that 
this distinction was not explicitly drawn by the court in B and D, and was not central to 
the decision.145   
 
Nevertheless, the court rejects the Crown’s proposal to apply the domestic definition of 
terrorism to the Refugee Convention for several reasons. First, recourse to domestic 
definitions undermines fundamental principles of international legal interpretation, as the 
employment of domestic legislation detracts from the search for an autonomous 
  
139 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department , above n 7, at [34].  
140 At [7].  
141 At [30].  
142 At [31].  
143 At [33]; Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 [2011] Imm AR 190 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and 
D  at [81].  
144 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department , above n 7, at [35].  
145 At [34].  
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international meaning.146 Moreover, s 54 IANA, which states that terrorist acts falling 
within the domestic definition of terrorism are included under art 1F(c), must be read 
down in light of art 12(2)(c) Qualification Directive 2004/EC/83, thereby precluding any 
application of a domestic terrorism definition.147 In this way, the court is able to disregard 
the confines of domestic statute within the context of a terrorism definition, and search 
for an “international meaning” of terrorism. 
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court acknowledges that no internationally-accepted 
formulation of terrorism yet exists.148 This absence of international consensus prompts 
the court to adopt a “cautious and restrictive” approach to the scope of art 1F(c) outlined 
by the UNHCR.149 Moreover, the court justifies reliance on the UNHCR guidelines by 
virtue of art 35 Refugee Convention, which requires states to “facilitate” the UNHCR’s 
Convention supervision duties.150 Thus, Al Sirri endorses the UNHCR Handbook’s 
formulation: 151 
 
Article 1F(c) is only triggered in extreme circumstances by activity which attacks 
the very basis of the international community’s coexistence. Such activity must 
have an international dimension. Crimes capable of affecting international peace, 
security and peaceful relations between states, as well as serious and sustained 
violations of human rights would fall under this category.  
(e) DD decision 
 
The Supreme Court also considers the application of art 1F(c) in the context of 
DD’s factual situation. The appellant in DD had fought against the ISAF in 
Afghanistan. While the operation was led by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (“NATO”), successive UNSC resolutions endorsed the force and 
acknowledged the mission’s importance in maintaining international peace and 
security.152  
 
  
146 At [36].  
147 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department , above n 7, at [36].  
148 At [37].  
149 At [38].  
150 At [38]. 
151 At [38]. 
152 At [50]-[58] 
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Counsel for DD contended that such an act could not be labelled contrary to UN 
purposes and principles as it had not be so declared by the UNSC, unlike acts of 
terrorism.153 The court rejects this formulation as unsupported by authority and 
contrary to a “common sense” reading of art 1F(c), which would encompass 
armed combat against a UN-mandated force.154 Instead, the court extends the 
UNHCR’s formulation to all acts falling under art 1F(c).155  
 
2 Critique of approach in Al Sirri and DD 
 
The Supreme Court’s case in Al Sirri and DD can be questioned for the following 
reasons.  
 
(a) Dismissal of the narrow interpretation in Pushpanathan  
 
Hale and Dyson LJJ’s dismissal of the majority’s approach in Pushpanathan does not 
fully engage with the Canadian Supreme Court’s reasoning. The court in Al Sirri and DD 
argues that Pushpanathan concerned a considerably different fact scenario to that of DD, 
leading the Canadian court to adopt an overly-restrictive interpretation of art 1F(c) which 
excluded “common sense” interpretations of UN purposes and principles such as armed 
combat against a UN-mandated force.156   
 
However, this argument does not fully engage with the majority’s rationale for adopting a 
restrictive interpretation. The Pushpanathan majority place much weight on the travaux 
preparatoires in applying a narrow meaning to art 1F(c), arguing that the drafters 
intended to ascribe a special meaning to art 1F(c).157 According to art 32 VCLT, the 
travaux preparatoires can guide courts where the meaning of a phrase remains 
ambiguous following an art 31 exercise. Despite the legitimate foundation of the 
majority’s argument on the VCLT rules, the court in Al Sirri and DD fails to address their 
rationale by examining the travaux preparatoires. Therefore, the court does not engage 
with the basic premise of the Pushpanathan majority’s argument.158       
  
153 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department , above n 7, at [66].  
154 At [66]-[67].  
155 At [66].  
156 At [67].  
157 Pushpanathan v Canada, above n 7, at [62].  
158 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 32. 
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Such an omission is likely based on the court’s obligation to apply the Qualification 
Directive, which precludes the court from adopting the narrow interpretation as proposed 
by the Pushpanathan majority, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the court fails to 
sufficiently address the Pushpanathan argument or acknowledge that the phrasing of the 
Qualification Directive restricts their analysis.  
 
(b) UNHCR guidelines application to art 1F(c) acts 
 
(i) Use of UNHCR guidelines in art 1F(c) interpretation 
 
As explored in the interpretation section discussion, the authority of the UNHCR 
materials in a VCLT interpretation exercise remains unclear. The court in Al Sirri and 
DD argues that the guidelines should be afforded “considerable weight” in light of the 
signatories’ obligation to facilitate the UNHCR’s supervision duties.159 However, 
commentators have questioned the scope of states’ art 35 obligation, and the ability of the 
UNHCR to fulfill its art 35 mandate apolitically.160 On the other hand, one could argue 
that the UNHCR materials fall under art 31(3)(b) “subsequent practice” based on a liberal 
construction of the House of Lords decision in A v Home Secretary.161 Nevertheless, the 
court in Al Sirri and DD does not attempt to justify its reliance on UNHCR materials, 
thereby giving cause to question whether such an approach accords with the VCLT.   
 
(ii) Formulation of UNHCR guidelines as a general rule for art 1F(c) 
 
In addition to concerns about the authority of UNHCR guidelines, the Supreme Court’s 
justifications for extending the UNHCR approach beyond the context of terrorism can be 
queried. Al Sirri and DD initially justifies adopting the UNHCR’s “cautious and 
restrictive approach” in the context of terrorism, due to the absence of an internationally-
accepted definition for terrorism.162 Therefore, the court authorises its application in the 
context in Al Sirri.163 Nevertheless, in analysing DD’s situation, the court proceeds to 
formulate the UNHCR approach as a general test applying to all acts under art 1F(c), 
including the case of DD. The court argues that such a test is a “principled” construction 
  
159 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [38].  
160 James C Hathaway, above n 50, at 25.  
161 See above discussion under interpretation section.  
162 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department , above n 7, at [36]-[38].  
163 At [38].  
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of art 1F(c) and gives effect to their art 35 obligation to facilitate the supervisory duty of 
the UNHCR.164  
 
However, the application of the UNHCR approach to all art 1F(c) acts arguably goes 
against the court’s obligations to apply art 12(2)(c) Qualification Directive. Article 
12(2)(c) directs EU members to apply art 1F(c) where the claimant has been guilty of acts 
contrary to UN purposes and principles “…set out in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of 
the Charter of the United Nations”.165 Where acts falling within this domain already have 
an internationally-accepted definition, it would appear contrary to the obligation of the 
Directive to deny their inclusion within art 1F(c) if they fail to meet the additional 
UNHCR Handbook test.  
 
Evidently, Al Sirri and DD’s framing of the UNHCR guidelines as a general rule for art 
1F(c) is problematic, both in relation to weight given to the guidelines and the adoption 
of an overly stringent test which appears to go against the Qualification Directive.  
 
(c)  Including acts of terrorism under art 1F(c) 
 
One could criticise Al Sirri and DD’s decision to endorse the inclusion of acts of 
international terrorism within art 1F(c) in light of academic commentary. While recital 22 
encourages EU members to extend art 1F(c) to acts, methods and practices of terrorism, 
the provision is not binding on the UK Supreme Court.166 Commentators have questioned 
that the applicability of acts of terrorism to art 1F(c) for several reasons. The European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (“ECRE”) argues that terrorist acts are likely to be 
adequately covered by arts 1F(a), 1F(b) and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. Indeed, the 
UK courts have accepted that terrorist acts can fall under 1F(b)’s “serious non-political” 
crimes, in spite of an alleged political motive.167 According to the ECRE, coverage of 
such acts under art 1F(c) would give the article an unnecessarily expansive ambit.168  
 
  
164 At [66].  
165 Directive 2004/EC/83 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country 
Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and 
the Content of the Protection Granted [2004] OJ L304/12, art 12(2)(c).  
166 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [4], Carl Gardner, above n 132.  
167 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Deprtament, above n 7, at [32]-[33]. 
168 European Council on Refugees and Exiles “Position on Exclusion from Refugee Status”(2004) 16 IJRL 
257 at 258-260.  
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In addition, academics argue that employment of the concept of terrorism should be 
entirely avoided within the context of art 1F in the absence of an internationally-accepted 
definition of the concept. The scholars contend that terrorism is a political and emotive 
concept which should not be given independent recognition under 1F, as sufficiently 
serious acts of terrorism are already provided for under the existing meaning of art 1F.169 
The absence of an internationally endorsed definition of the term gives states the ability 
to apply the concept arbitrarily.170 The commentators contend that the enquiry should not 
be centered on whether an act is terrorist in nature, but rather whether an act falls within 
the Convention wording of art 1F.171  
 
Moreover, Al Sirri and DD’s inclusion of terrorism within art 1F(c) is derived from 
UNSC declarations, which are not necessarily the appropriate source for art 1F(c) 
direction. The court refers to UNSC Resolution 1373, and its reproduction in recital 22 of 
the Directive, in justifying the necessity to include terrorism under art 1F(c).172 However, 
the legitimacy of UN declarations in defining art 1F(c) acts has been questioned by 
Hathaway and Harvey.  
 
The authors criticise the majority in Pushpanathan for endorsing widely-accepted UN 
UNGA declarations as “determinative” of art 1F(c) acts.173 The commentators argue that 
non-binding UNGA resolutions should not be considered authority in stipulating the 
scope of a Refugee Convention article.174 Similarly, one could argue that UNSC 
resolutions are ill-qualified to direct the content of art 1F(c). While such declarations are 
binding on UN member states, the resolutions are not necessarily representative of the 
international community, as the UNSC includes only 15 member states.175 Moreover, the 
constitution of the UNSC is weighted toward its five permanent members, who have a 
continual presence on the UNSC and the power of veto. As a result, there is no guarantee 
that UNSC resolutions represent a general agreement of the international community. 
Indeed, Hathaway and Harvey instead endorse the definition of art 1F(c) acts with 
  
169 Satvinder Singh Juss, above n 5, at 468; James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 269, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, above n 29, at 8.  
170 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 269. 
171 Satvinder Singh Juss, above n 5, at 474-475.  
172 Al Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 7, at [37].  
173 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 271-272. 
174 At 271-272.  
175 United Nations Security Council “The Security Council” (2013) United Nations < 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/>.  
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reference to widely subscribed international conventions on human rights and criminal 
law.176 Moreover, as recital 22 is not applicable in the New Zealand context, the courts 
will be less inclined to give effect to UNSC Resolution 1373 by including terrorism under 
art 1F(c).  
 
 
IV Conclusion: New Zealand’s approach to art 1F(c) 
 
New Zealand’s treatment of art 1F(c), outlined in Refugee Appeal 2338/94, has been 
widely discredited by the Canadian majority in Pushpanathan, the UK courts in Al Sirri 
and DD and academic commentators. The New Zealand approach endorses an overly-
wide formulation of art 1F(c) which goes against its statutory context and the intentions 
of the drafters in the travaux preparatoires. Such a case is more appropriately dealt with 
under art 33(2) Refugee Convention.    
 
On the other hand, the restrictive interpretation endorsed by the Canadian majority in 
Pushpanathan is overly narrow, as it confines UN “purposes and principles” to violations 
of human rights. This excludes consideration of other principles outlined in the UN 
Charter, and therefore goes against a “common sense” interpretation of art 1F(c).   
 
Moreover, the reasoning in the UK Supreme court case of Al Sirri and DD is problematic. 
The court fails to justify the legitimacy of invoking the UNHCR guidelines in a VCLT 
interpretation exercise. Moreover, the extension of the UNHCR guidelines beyond 
terrorism, to concepts with settled international definitions, could conflict with the court’s 
obligations under art 12(2)(c) Qualification Directive. In addition, the concept of 
terrorism arguably should not be independently included under art 1F(c), due to its 
inherently political nature. Nevertheless, the English courts’ obligation to apply 
Qualification Directive 2004/EC/83 somewhat explains these shortcomings. As no such 
interpretative directions constrain New Zealand decision-makers, New Zealand courts 
have reason to diverge from the UK Supreme Court’s approach.  
 
In light of these findings, this paper advises New Zealand courts in future cases to depart 
from the approach articulated in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. Moreover, the courts should 
undertake a thorough application of arts 31 and 32 VCLT, and review whether the 
UNHCR guidelines should be given weight in light of the above discussion. Finally, this 
  
176 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, above n 5, at 272.  
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paper would discourage New Zealand courts from including “acts of terrorism” as a 
discrete concept under art 1F(c), as such an approach will cause considerable ambiguity, 
and is not adequately supported by authority.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: The text of this paper is exactly 8,000 (excludes footnotes). 
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VI Appendix 1: Relevant UN Charter provisions 
 
A Preamble: 
 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DETERMINED 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for 
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
 
AND FOR THESE ENDS 
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and 
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the 
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, 
 
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS 
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city 
of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, 
have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an 
international organization to be known as the United Nations. 
 
  
B Article 1 
 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
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international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends. 
 
C Article 2 
 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act 
in accordance with the following Principles. 
 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members. 
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting 
from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the present Charter. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes 
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to 
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement 
action. 
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United 
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
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state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
 
 
 
 
